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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LAYTON CITY,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

OPENING BRIEF OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

v.
KENNETH KEMP,
Defendant-Appellant.

:

Case No. 950293-CA
Category 2

JURISDICTION
Defendant-Appellant Kenneth Kemp appealsfromhis Second Circuit Court
conviction of Interference with Public Servant, a class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301(1) (1953, as amended). This Court has jurisdiction
over Mr. Kemp's appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) and (f) (1953,
as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 unconstitutionally vague or overbroad

on its face?
2.
Kemp?

Was Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 unconstitutionally applied to Mr.

3.

Was the evidence insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt

that Mr. Kemp committed the offense of Interference with Public Servant?
4.

Did the trial court commit plain error in failing to adequately define the

essential element of "intimidation" in the jury instructions?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging thefreedomof speech."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
relevant part that "No State shall... deprive any person of life, hberty or property,
without due process of law."
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part that "All
men have the inherent and inahenable right... to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states that "No person shall be
deprived of life, hberty or property, without due process of law."
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part that "No
law shall be passed to abridge or restrain thefreedomof speech."

2

The Utah Criminal Code defines the offense of Interference with Public
Servant as follows:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he uses force, violence,
intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to
interfere with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an
official function.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Kemp's prosecution for Interference with Public Servant arosefromtwo
May 1994 encounters with Brent Johnstun, a Davis County deputy constable. Mr.
Kemp's housemate, Gretchen Graehl, had been sued by a collection agency after she
bounced a check at a Salt Lake City bookstore.1 (R. 301).
On May 9,1994, Mr. Johnstun went to the Kemp-Graehl home to serve a
bench warrant for Gretchen's arrest for failure to appear.2 (R. 217-18). Mr.
Johnstun approached Mr. Kemp, who was outside the home, and stated that he was
looking for Ms. Graehl. Mr. Kemp stated incorrectly that she was not home, said he
did not want to talk to Mr. Johnstun and attempted to go into his home and close the

1

Judgment against Mr. Graehl in the amount of $251.38 was entered on November
23,1993. (R. 86)
2

The bench warrant was issued by the Layton Circuit Court on April 12,1994.
(Exhibit P-1,R. 83)
3

door. (R. 217). Mr. Johnstun put his foot in the door to prevent its closing and
informed Mr. Kemp that he had a bench warrant for Ms. Graehl's arrest. He also
told Mr. Kemp that he was "obstructing justice." (R. 262). According to Mr.
Johnstun, Mr. Kemp said he did not care about the bench warrant and slammed the
door after the constable moved his foot. (R. 218).
According to Mr. Kemp, Mr. Johnstun was wearing a gun and speaking
loudly and appeared to be angry. (R. 316). On May 10,1994, Mr. Kemp called a
lawyer at the Davis County Attorney's office. He wanted to know whether he could
walk away from a constable, rather than be required to continue to talk, if he was
not the person upon whom the constable was attempting to serve documents. (R.
317).
On May 11,1994, the court issued a writ of execution and praecipe
authorizing the seizure of Ms. Graehl's 1991 Honda automobile. (Exhibit P-l; R.
85-86). On the evening of May 12,1994, Mr. Johnstun drove to the Kemp-Graehl
home to serve these documents and the bench warrant. As he drove up, he saw Mr.
Kemp and Ms. Graehl in thefrontyard. (R. 197). He called for a tow truck and
asked the Layton City Police Department to send an officer for back-up. (R. 198).
According to Mr. Johnstun, Ms. Graehl went into the house as he began to
walk up the driveway. (R. 199). Mr. Johnstun got the papers ready and approached
4

the door. (R. 200). When Ms. Graehl came outside, he gave her the writ of
execution and began to explain that he had to take her car. (R. 200-01). According
to Mr. Johnstun's testimony, Mr. Kemp then came over, stepped in between the two
and said "What's going on?" (R. 201,203). Mr. Kemp also told the constable to
direct the conversation to him rather than to Ms. Graehl, who was upset. (R. 202).
Mr. Johnstun's 6-page statement, prepared the day after the incident, did not
assert that Mr. Kemp stepped in between the constable and Ms. Graehl. (R. 235).
Rather, the report stated that Mr. Kemp "interrupted and said, what's all this? I told
him I didn't wish to speak for him and for him to stand over on the sidewalk. I
explained the papers were for Gretchen. With this, I proceeded to explain the
paperwork but was interrupted again." (R. 236).
Officer Dale May of the Layton City Police Department saw the three arguing
when he arrived at the Kemp-Graehl residence. As he walkedfromthe car for a
period of about 15 seconds, the officer observed Mr. Kemp talking to Mr. Johnstun.
(R. 278).Ms. Graehl was behind and to the side of Mr. Kemp. (R. 268). Officer
May testified that Mr. Kemp was "in Mr. Johnstun's face," (R. 274), although his
report did not include mat statement. (R. 280-1). He did not hear Mr. Kemp
threaten Mr. Johnstun. (R. 279).

5

As Officer May approached, Mr. Kemp told him that he had talked with a
Davis County attorney and did not have to answer questions or say anything to the
constable. (R. 268). Officer May told Mr. Kemp to stand to the side so that he
could deal with Ms. Graehl and the constable. (R. 274). Mr. Kemp stood on the
sidewalk for a while, but came back over to the group when Mr. Johnstun began to
arrest Ms. Graehl, who "started getting hysterical and yelling." Officer May again
told Mr. Kemp to move away, and he did as he was told. (R. 209). The officer
testified that when he wasfirm,Mr. Kemp complied with his orders. (R. 283).
Mr. Johnstun, who carries a gun when serving bench warrants and writs of
execution, (R. 213), testified that he felt "insecure" and "threatened" because of the
May 9 incident at the home. (R. 204-05,208). He admitted that Mr. Kemp did not
touch him or threaten to hurt him, although he may have sworn at him. (R. 248-49).
Officer May also testified that Mr. Kemp did not touch him or threaten him, other
than to say that he would contact at attorney at some point in the future. (R. 294).
On June 8,1994, an Information was filed in Layton Circuit Court charging
Mr. Kemp with Interference with Public Servant, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
77-8-301. The Information alleged that the offense had been committed on May 12,
1994. (R. 6). An Amended Information, changing the date of the offense to May 9,
1994, was filed on September 16,1994. (R. 33). On December 15,1994, the date
6

set for trial to a jury, the City of Layton moved to amend the charges again, to return
to the original offense date of May 12,1994. The City's motion was granted and the
trial was continued. (R. 2).
After substitution of defense counsel, Mr. Kemp's Motion for Bill of
Particulars was filed on March 16,1995. (R. 77). In response the Cityfiledan
Amended Bill of Particulars on March 28,1995, stating that the offense occurred on
May 12,1994 as follows:
As constable Brant [sic] Johnstun attempted to execute an arrest
warrant and serve a Praecipe and Writ of Execution on Gretchen
Graehl, Defendant placed himself in between the constable and Ms.
Graehl and yelled at the constable using foul and abusive language,
with the purpose of intimidating the constable and interfering with the
execution and service of the warrant and praecipe.
(R. 79-80).
Trial to a jury began on March 30,1995. Mr. Johnstun and Officer May
testified for the prosecution. Mr. Kemp testified that he did not get between Mr.
Johnstun and Ms. Graehl, or otherwise get in the constable's face. When Mr.
Johnstun began to speak with Ms. Graehl, Ms. Kemp was petting his cats. After
overhearing the constable say that he was going to arrest her and take her car, Mr.
Kemp walked over to Mr. Johnstun and asked what he was doing and why. (R.
318). Officer May arrived as Mr. Kemp was asking those questions. (R. 319).
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Ms. Graehl also testified that Mr. Kemp did not stand infrontof Mr.
Johnstun or get in between them. (R. 303,306-07). She said that Mr. Kemp was
not involved to any significant degree in interactions with the constable. (R. 305).
She did not remember Mr. Kemp saying he would speak for her or that Mr.
Johnstun did not have any authority to serve the documents and carry out their
orders. (R. 306). Ms. Graehl's parents also testified. They contradicted testimony
from Officer May that Mr. Kemp had walked with him and yelled comments as he
took Ms. Graehl to his patrol car, (R. 293).3 (R. 312-13,331-32).
At the end of the prosecution's case, Mr. Kemp reserved his right to argue
a motion to dismiss the charge against him. (R. 300-01). In arguing the motion at
the conclusion of the case, defense counsel contended that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8301 would be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad unless it was interpreted to
define "interference" as requiring more than mere remonstrance, criticisms,
interruption or distraction of a police officer. (R. 340-1). Counsel argued that there
was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Kemp of violating the statute as properly
construed. (R. 342). The prosecutor that Mr. Kemp could be convicted based on
testimony that he physically placed himself between Mr. Johnstun and Ms. Graehl
3

The charge against Mr. Kemp was based on his interaction with Mr. Johnstun
before Officer May arrived, and not his supposed actions when Ms. Graehl was taken into
custody. (R. 288-89, 360).
8

and that he was in Mr. Johnstun's face. According to the prosecutor, that action,
together with the words spoken by Mr. Kemp, estabhshed "intimidation." (R. 34445). The trial court took the Motion to Dismiss under advisement. (R. 348).
The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Kemp guilty as charged. (R. 128).
He was sentenced to 40 days in jail and a fine of $300, with the jail term and $100
of the fine suspended. He was placed on probation for 12 months. (R. 4,129).
On April 7,1995, the trial court entered an Amended Memorandum of
Decision, denying Mr. Kemp's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 4,132). According to the
court:
In this case, there was more than name calling; it went beyond
the verbal. Had Defendant stayed aside and expressed his criticism of
what the constable was doing, we'd have had another scenario entirely.
... Here we had more on Defendant's part. It was his physical
interference, his repeated placing of himself between the constable and
the person the constable was dealing with that went too far. It was the
positioning of Defendant's person, his body, between the constable and
Defendant's girl friend [sic] and his making statements which could
reasonably be taken as threatening that constituted the interference.
Defendant forced the constable either to cease doing his job or to use
force against Defendant. A person may not impose that choice on a
public servant attempting to carry out his responsibilities. ...
Defendant's demeanor here was hostile and threatening. An officer is
not required to mix it up in a streetfightwith a defendant's live-in
boyfriend in order to carry out a personal property execution and a
warrant of arrest.
(R. 132-33).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 fails to adequately define the offense of
Interference with Public Servant and includes conduct protected by the free speech
clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions. The statute is vague and
overbroad on its face.
The application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 to convict Mr. Kemp was
unconstitutional because it punished him for constitutionally-protected speech.
Even taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was
insufficient to prove that Mr. Kemp committed Interference with Public Servant in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301.
The trial court committed plain error in failing to adequately define
"intimidation," an element of the offense of Interference with Public Servant, in the
jury's instructions.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-301 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON
ITS FACE.
In addressing a facial challenge to the overbreadth or vagueness of a statute, a

court must first "determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct." City of Houston v. Hill. 482 U.S. 451,458
10

(1987). Accord, Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 359, n.8 (1983). If a criminal
statute is attacked, it must be examined with particular care. Criminal laws that
punish "a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held
facially invalid even if they also have legitimate application." Hill, 482 U.S. at 459;
accord, Kojender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8.
In Hill and Kolender. the Court recognized the vitality of facial challenges to
statutes affecting the right to free speech and free association. The Court explicitly
rejected the argument that a law "should not be held unconstitutionally vague on its
face unless it is vague in all of its possible applications."4 Kolender. 461 U.S. at
358 n.3; accord, Hill, 482 U.S. at 459.
Here, § 76-8-301 proscribes, inter alia, the use of "intimidation" with the
purpose of interfering a public servant. On its face, the interference statute applies
to constitutionally-protected conduct. In the absence of a narrowing construction, it
authorizes the prosecution of someone who makes statements which are
"intimidating" but nonetheless protected by the free speech clauses of the federal
4

Utah courts have used this language, derivedfromVillage of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipsider Hoffinan Estates. Inc.. 455 U.S. 489 (1982). Greenwood y, City pf North Salt Lake,
817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); State y Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991).
However, as the United States Supreme Court explained, Hoffinan Estates addressed economic
regulations, to which a less strict test applied, rather than a law which imposed criminal penalties
in situations where free speech or free association were affected. Kolender 461 U.S. at 358 n.8.
The Greenwood and Archamheau decisions are inconsistent with Kolender unless they are
interpreted to include this distinction.
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and state constitutions. On its face, the statute does not require some criminal
action in addition to verbal "intimidation," and no such requirement has been
announced by Utah's appellate courts.
A.

Mr. Kemp's conviction under Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-301 violates the due process clauses of the United
States and Utah Constitutions, because the statute is
unconstitutionally vague.

"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness
if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S.
104,108 (1972). To withstand a vagueness challenge, a statute must satisfy two
discrete standards. First, to provide fair warning, the law must give a person of
ordinary intelhgence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Second,
to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application, the law must provide explicit
standards for law enforcement officers, prosecutors and the courts. Kolender v.
Lawson. 461 U.S. at 357 (1983); Papaehristou v, City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972); Greenwood v. Citv of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991).
Beyond these principles, "where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a
narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by
the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in
other contexts." Smith v. Goguen. 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). Inadequately-defined
12

statutes chill the exercise of First Amendment rights because "uncertain meanings
inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked'" Grayned. 408 U.S. at 109.
A law proscribing "interference" would be unconstitutionally vague if it did
not provide more specific definitions. State v. Bradshaw. 541 P.2d 800,803 n.5
(Utah 1975) (Henriod, J., concurring). The offense of Interference with Public
Servant is defined in Utah as the following:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he uses force, violence,
intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to
interfere with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an
official function.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301(1).
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected a vagueness challenge to § 76-8-301.
State v. Theobald. 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982) (per curiam). Mr. Kemp contends that
Theobald was wrongly decided. The opinion contains no analysis; it simply recites
the first vagueness standard — whether a statute's terms tell the ordinary reader what
is prohibited — and concludes that § 76-8-301 specifically describes the proscribed
conduct. 645 P.2d at 51. The supreme court did not analyze the second vagueness
standard - whether the statue provides sufficient guidelines for its enforcement by
police, prosecutors and the courts..

13

The United States Supreme Court has identified this second standard as the
more important of the two. Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S. at 358. In KoJendei,

me

Court addressed a California statute which required persons to provide "credible
and reliable" identification and account for their presence on the street if requested
by the police under circumstances justifying a stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio. 392
U.S. 1 (1968). 461 U.S. at 357.
The California courts had defined "credible and reliable" identification to be
that "carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing
means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself." 461
U.S. at 356-57. The Supreme Court held that, even with this limiting construction,
the California statute was unconstitutionally vague. According to Justice O'Connor,
it "contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy
the requirement to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification. As such, the
statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine
whether the suspect has satisfied the statute." 461 U.S. at 358.
In the instant case, § 76-8-301 does not define "mtimidation" and the Utah
Supreme Court did not provide a narrowing construction in Theobald The statute
does not adequately provide notice of what is prohibited by the proscription against
"intimidation." Moreover, it is subject to interpretation by individual public servants
14

and may be applied in some situations but not other, based upon a public servant's
feeling that he or she has been "intimidated." As a result, § 76-8-301 is
unconstitutionally vague.
B.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 is overbroad in violation of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Sections 1 and 15 of the Utah
Constitution.

A statute may be invalid on its face if it is overbroad - "susceptible of
application to speech, although vulgar or offensive, that is protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Lewis v. City of New Orleans. 415 US. 130,134
(1974). The defendant in Lewis was convicted of violating a New Orleans
ordinance which made it a crime for any person "wantonly to curse or revile or to
use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the
city police while in the actual performance of his duty." 415 U.S. at 132. She
allegedly yelled and cursed at a police officer who stopped a truck in which she was
a passenger and asked the driver, her husband, for his license. 415 U.S. at 131, n.l.
According to the United States Supreme Court, "the First Amendment
protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police
officers." City of Houston v. Hill. 482 U.S. at 461. As the Court explained in Hill,
speech may be provocative or defiant, but it is "nevertheless protected against
15

censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or
unrest." 482 U.S. at 461 (quoting Terminiellnv Chicago 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949)).
A statute may only penalize speech considered to be within the "fighting
words" doctrine. "Fighting words" are defined as "those words which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." They are
not protected by the First Amendment. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132 (quoting Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).In Lewis, the New Orleans
ordinance thus was overbroad since it could be applied to speech which, although
offensive, did not meet the constitutional definition of "fighting words." 415 U.S. at
134.
The overbreadth doctrine also has been applied to a state statute punishing
breach-of-the-peace, which was not limited to "fighting words." Gooding v. Wilson.
405 U.S. 518 (1972). In Hill, the Court noted Justice Powell's earlier suggestion, in
his concurring opinion in Lewis, that the "fighting words" doctrine might apply more
narrowly to speech addressed to police officers, because they could be expected to
react with more restraint than other citizens. 482 U.S. at 462 (citing Lewis, 415
U.S. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring)). The ordinance in Hill made it unlawful to "in
any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his
16

duty." 482 U.S. at 461. In using a broad prohibition aimed at speech, rather than
simply punishing physical obstruction of police action, the Houston ordinance was
unconstitutional on its face.
Here, § 76-8-301 on its face goes beyond prohibiting physical conduct.
Instead, the proscription against "intimidation" does not on its face require physical
action, but criminalizes the mere utterance of words. The statute aims at speech of a
particular content-based category - words which might "intimidate" or cause fear in
a pubhc servant in some manner. The resulting classification of speech outlawed by
§ 76-8-301 is subjective and does not distinguish speech protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and by Article I, Sections 1 and 15 of
the Utah Constitution.

II.

EVEN IF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-301 IS VALID ON ITS
FACE, ITS APPLICATION TO MR. KEMP WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court determines that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-

301 is valid on its face, the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Mr. Kemp to
punish him for the content of protected speech to Mr. Johnstun. As argued below,
at its best the city's case against Mr. Kemp was that he stood between Ms. Graehl
and Mr. Johnstun and basically said "you can't do this, what are you doing." (R.
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345). The prosecutor admitted that the city's allegation that Mr. Kemp used
intimidation was based on the statements he was making, coupled with the
physical act of placing himself between Mr. Johnstun and Ms. Graehl. (R. 361,
emphasis added).
In focusing on the content of Mr. Kemp's words, constitutionally protected
speech must be distinguished from that which can be criminalized. For example, in
applying statutes punishing threats of death and physical injury, "only 'true threats'
may be criminalized."5 Melugin v Hames. 38 F.3d 1478,1484 (9th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Wafts v United States 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)). C/, Landrvv Dalev.
280 F.Supp. 938,961-62 (N.D. HI. 1968) (State lacks a legitimate interest in
penalizing as ''mtimidation" statements that do not reasonably tend to coerce or
which, although alarming, are not expressions of an intent to act.").
Here, Mr. Kemp's statements to Mr. Johnstun may have implied the belief
that he did not have the authority to legitimately arrest Ms. Graehl or take his car.
They also may have disparaged Mr. Johnstun and his actions. Even so, they did not
amount to "fighting words" or to a "true threat" as those doctrines have been

5

"True threats" are statements which are reasonably foreseeable to be interpreted as
a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of a person
Melugin. 38 F 3d at 1484 Utah Code Ann § 76-8-508(2)(c), which punishes the communication
of a threat, contains a similar limitation
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described above. Unless these statements were reasonably likely to provoke an
immediate breach of the peace or reasonably tended to create an apprehension of
immediate harm, punishing Mr. Kemp for speaking them violates the First
Amendment to the federal constitution and by Article I, Sections 1 and 15 of the
state constitution.
III.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
MR. KEMP'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
A criminal conviction violates due process of law it is obtained based on

evidence which does not establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to every
essential element of the offense. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). A conviction
may not rest upon evidence which is "sufficiently inconclusively or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,117 (Utah 1989).
In analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and
all of its reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. State v Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v Webb. 790
P.2d 65, 84 (Utah App. 1990). Even under this strict standard of review, the
evidence against Mr. Kemp did not show that he was guilty of each element of the
crime of Interference with Public Servant.
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The offense required proof that Mr. Kemp used "intimidation" to interfere
with Mr. Johnstun. As explained above, to comply with the state and federal
constitutions, § 76-8-301 must be interpreted to require more than the armed
constable's assertions that he "felt threatened" or that he believed he would not be
able to carry out his responsibilities. This is especially true in light of his admission
that he felt threatened "because of a previous incident at that resident." (R. 204-05).
In that incident, on May 9,1994, Mr. Johnstun had attempted to forcibly prevent
Mr. Kempfromclosing the door to his own home and had asserted erroneously that
he was subject to prosecution for obstructing justice.
At most, the testimony shows that Mr. Kemp simply challenged Mr.
Johnstun's authority and criticized him. There is no evidence to support the idea that
it would have been reasonable for Mr. Johnstun to believe that Mr. Kemp had the
imminent intent and ability to harm him to prevent himfromacting on the bench
warrant and writ of execution. In the absence of evidence establishing the crucial
element of "intimidation," Mr. Kemp's conviction violates due process.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO DEFINE THE
ELEMENT OF "INTIMIDATION" IN THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS WAS PLAIN ERROR
Jury instructions must set forth the issues and applicable law "in a clear,

concise and orderly manner, so that the jury will understand how to discharge its
responsibilities." State v. Torres. 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980). "An accurate
instruction upon the basic elements of the offense charged is essential." State v.
L a m 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980); accord, State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah
1991).
When the defense has not objected to an erroneous jury instruction at trial, a
showing of plain error is required. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Gibson. 908
P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995). An error is plain if it should have been obvious to the
trial court and it is harmful, because in its absence, there would have been a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome, or confidence in the jury's
verdict is undermined. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993).
In Mr. Kemp's case, jurors were told in Instruction No. 6 that the use of
intimidation or any other unlawful act was necessary to convict him, but
"intimidation" was not defined. (R. 115). In Instruction No. 8, jurors were
instructed that, tofindthat Mr. Kemp used intimidation with the purpose to
interfere, they had tofindthat he:
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[D]id more than remonstrate or criticize the public servant.
Interrupting or distracting a public servant, without more, are
insufficient to justify afindingthat a person used intimidation with a
purpose to interfere. A person is said to remonstrate when he earnestly
presents reasons of opposition or grievance.
(R. 117).
In describing what was not "intimidation," Instruction No. 8 failed to provide
a definition of this crucial term. Cf., State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254,262 (Utah
1988) (Although it was not technically incorrect to give an instruction which did not
affirmatively define "grave risk of death" but stated what the risk need not be, the
term should have been defined). Here, a definition of "intimidation" could have
been drafted using, by analogy, the definition of "communicating a threat" under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c): communicating "to a person a threat that a
reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person."
The lack of an adequate definition of the essential element of "intimidation"
should have been obvious to the trial court. Because an appropriate instruction was
not given, it is reasonably likely that jurors applied an incorrect view of the law to
the facts of the case, when a jury accurately instructed about what was necessary for
conviction would not have returned a guilty verdict. In short, the lack of an
adequate instruction allowed Mr. Kemp's conviction on less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and for speech which was constitutionally protected.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons and authorities contained in Arguments I - HI, Mr. Kemp
requests the Court to vacate his conviction. For the reasons and authorities in
Argument IV, Mr. Kemp asks the Court to remand the case for a new trial before a
properly-instructed jury.

/JAMES C. BRADSHAW
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